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Das Ereignis Auschwitz: 
the Ontology of Modernity
Thus far the Polish reader has had no opportunity to become acquainted with the 
important voices in the debate of the 1980s and 1990s concerning the philosophical 
and political implications o f the Holocaust.1 Alan Milchman’s and Alan Rosenberg’s 
Eksperymenty w myśleniu o Holokauście. Auschwitz, nowoczesność i filozofia,2 brings
I am referring primarily to the significant books by French philosophers: Ph. Lacoue- 
-Labarthe, L a  Fiction du politique. Heidegger, Vart et la politique; J. Derrida, De lesprit. 
Heidegger et la question; J.-F. Lyotard, Heidegger et “la ju ifs”and Le Différend', L. Ferry 
and A. Renault Heidegger et les Modernnes; S. Kofman,paroles suffoqués', and the most 
important English language voices in the debate, such as: S. Friedlander’s, Reflections 
of Nazism: An Essay On Kitch and Death and Memory, History and the Extermination of 
Jews o f Europe; Y. Bauer, The Holocaust in Historical Perspective', D. LaCapra, History and 
Memory after Auschwitz and Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma', B. Lang, 
Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide and Holocaust Representation. A rt within the Limits of 
History and Ethics. The Polish reader had the opportunity to become acquainted with 
the German debate, with contributions from D.J.K. Peukert, D.Diner, and J. Habermas, 
in the anthologies: Historikerstreit. Spór o miejsce II I  Rzeszy w historii Niemiec, ed.
M. Lukasiewicz, Londyn, 1990, and Nazizm, Trzecia Rzesza a procesy modernizacyjne, 
sel. and ed. H. Orłowski, Poznań, 2000. Among the more important texts the only 
one fully translated into Polish is Z. Bauman’s Modernity and the Holocaust, Cornell 
University Press, 2001, translated in 1992, which inspired a heated debate.
A. Milchman, A. Rosenberg, Eksperymenty w myśleniu o Holokauście: Auschwitz, 
nowoczesność i filozofia, trans. L . Krowicki, J. Szacki, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 
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a flashback o f that discussion, relating to the key issues o f the debate: the problem of the 
exceptional and universal character o f the Holocaust; the fiasco o f “the project of the 
Enlightenment” and the end o f the idea o f progress; “the case o f Heidegger”3 (which had 
a continuation a few years later in “the case o f Paul de Man”); the problem of m emory 
and forgetting in the public sphere: anamnestic solidarity with the murdered, the official 
historical discourse, the problem of the “excess o f memory,” and the phenomenon of 
“traumatized memory,” which locks individuals in the trap of posthistory.4
For the authors the key issue remains the relationship between the “technology” of 
the Holocaust, that is, the totality o f the social and technical infrastructure which made 
it possible, and the internal logic of modernization. Milchman and Rosenberg perceive 
the Holocaust as a modern, science informed “transformative event” :
In our appropriation of Dan Diner’s term das Ereignis Auschwitz we want to preserve the Hei- 
deggerian sense of disclosure or lack of concealment and also the emphasis on some features 
which...we ascribe to Ereignis, features which would have been concealed were we simply to talk 
of an event or an incident: firstly, the progressive character of the event...secondly, its coming, 
its approaching us, something pointing toward the future; thirdly the fact that the stake here 
is disclosure -  in the sense of revelation -  of something important, something transformative 
in its influence on humankind.5
Das Ereignis Auschwitz is what is about to come, an event whose consequences have not been 
fully revealed, but model the unpredictable future shape of the political sphere. Introducing 
this topic into the larger discussion is undoubtedly the most important contribution made 
by the authors. The relationship between “Modernity and the Holocaust” has been addressed
In fact, “the case o f  Heidegger” had a large response in Poland. The discussion on the 
topic begun in Znak, 1974, no 6(24), to broaden in scope after the famous interview 
with the philosopher, “Tylko Bóg może nas uratować” [Only G od may save us] 
appeared in Teksty 1977, no 3(33) (first published in Der Spiegel, May 31, 1976). An 
important role was played by Aletheia, 1990 1(4) titled Heidegger dzisiaj [Heidegger 
today] devoted to the topic and containing a broad range o f  materials, including 
texts from Le Nouvell Observateur (1988) and from the Frankfurt anthology edited 
by J. Altwegg Die Heidegger kontroverse (1988) that is, commentary belonging to the 
new phase o f the discussion initiated by the publication o f  Victor Farias’ book. Among 
the Polish publications it is worth mentioning C. W idziński’s Heidegger i problem 
zła [Heidegger and the problem o f evil], 1994. V. Farias’s Heidegger and Nazism  was 
published in Polish as Heidegger and National Socialism in 1997 with an introductory 
essay by J. Habermas, reprinted from the German edition. Among other publications, 
there were: J. Young, Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism (published in Polish in 2000 as 
Heidegger, filozofia, nazizm); H. Ott, Martin Heidegger: A  Political Life (published in 
Polish in 1997 as Martin Heidegger. W drodze ku biografii); and O. Pöggeler, Martin 
Heidegger’s Path ofThinking (published in Polish in 2002 as Droga myślowa Martina 
Heideggera).
For a broader discussion o f  this phenomenon see: A. Leder, “Przemoc, krzywda 
i racjonalność. W  horyzoncie myśli Waltera Benjamina,” Kultura i Społeczeństwo, 2003, 
no 3.
A. Milchman and A. Rosenberg, Eksperymenty...http://rcin.org.pl
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in detail before.6 This time emphasis is placed on “the transformative potential” of the event 
of the Holocaust, that is, a redefinition it has triggered of the fundamental perceptions of 
the future. For it is a significant fact, as Arendt emphasizes in relation to genocide, that 
what happened once may happen again. The possibility of a repetition of what, until the 
moment it happened, had seemed impossible (unthinkable), and thus was not a part of 
a possible future, begins to define the horizon o f the future and indirectly determines all 
our projects from the moment it became reality. This possibility of a repetition is the more 
probable the easier it will be in successive generations “to forget the holes of oblivion, the 
mass manufacture of corpses.”7 As Zygmunt Bauman points out, “We know now that we 
live in a type of society that made the Holocaust possible, and that contained nothing which 
could stop the Holocaustfrom happening”  (emphasis mine, TM). When it comes to the study 
of the Holocaust, even if  that had not been clear from the beginning, “Much more [has 
been] involved in such a study than the tribute to the memory of the murdered millions, 
settling the account with the murderers, and healing the still-festering moral wounds of 
the passive and silent witnesses.” Reflection on the Holocaust itself is not enough to prevent 
its return. “Yet without such a study, we would not even know how likely and improbable 
such a return might be.”9 The future dimension of the Holocaust is an ever open threat of 
repetition on a scope impossible to determine and in a shape difficult to predict, as implied 
by the modern biotechnologies and means of digital control. The reality of such possibility 
remains “suspended,” but the fact that, as Ernst Bloch argues, this possibility is objectively 
potentially real places permanent pressure on the political present.10 When we become 
aware of it, the threat of the future means the necessity to act for the transformation of 
the current state o f the public sphere. This necessity is ethically grounded and the shape 
of the approaching future depends on the degree to which the modern reflection on the 
motifs of the genocidal universum will be able to transform the ethical and political ideas 
that determine the framework of human coexistence.
Thought experiments we have engaged in and the new truths they could generate are related 
to the very perspective of transforming our existence, our being. This adventure also contains 
the possibility of changing the social and cultural matrix.11 (emphasis mine, TM)
Philosophy that undertakes the task o f rethinking Auschwitz is for these authors an en­
gagement “in which critique and the impossibility of separating it from practice, would
R. Hilberg, The Destruction o f the European Jews (1961) New York, 1985; Z. Bauman’s 
Modernity and the Holocaust, Cornell University Press, 2001; D .J.K. Peukert,
“The Genesis o f  the 'Final Solution’ from the Spirit o f  Science,” 1994; R. Zitelman, 
“Die Totalitäre Seite der Moderne, 1991.
H. Arendt, „Concluding Remarks” to The Origins o f Totalitarianism, Harcourt, Brace
&  Company, 1951, 430.
Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, Cornell University Press, 2001, 87.
Ibid.
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shape the activity of thinking.”12 D as Ereignis Auschwitz remains a transformative event 
insofar as “thinking about Auschwitz” itself means an interior transformation o f thought 
(metanoia) and the resulting transformation o f the basic categories o f culture. It is no 
accident that the contemporary relevance o f the Holocaust mentioned earlier remains 
the premise o f the ethical duty to “transform thought.”
Holocaust has opened the doors to the genocidal universum, a “world” in which mass death 
inflicted by people becomes the constitutive feature of the social and political life. At the 
beginning of the new century...this door remains open.13
Thinking about Auschwitz is transformative here because it takes up what is o f contem­
porary relevance to us, and therefore what is a constitutive, if  unnamed, moral, practical, 
and political dimension of life.
The point is not therefore the analysis of truth, but what one could call the ontology of con­
temporaneity, the ontology of ourselves and, it seems to me, that the philosophical choice 
confronting us today is the following: one could opt for critical philosophy that would rep­
resent itself as an analytical philosophy of truth, or for critical thought that takes the form of 
an ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the present. This is the form of philosophy that from 
Hegel, through Nietzsche and Max Weber, to the Frankfurt School has founded the form of 
reflection within which I attempt to work as well. 14
M ost likely this is the form  o f thinking within which the authors o f Eksperymenty 
w myśleniu o Holokauście would situate themselves as well.
One of the basic spheres that have changed under the influence o f the reflection on 
Auschwitz is the modern form o f understanding time and the awareness o f history based 
on this understanding. For it is a challenge to historical discourse to confront what for 
ethical, political, or religious reasons does not simply recede into the past, but situates 
itself “vertically” in relation to the historical-narrative continuum. Holocaust has “fallen 
out o f history” in precisely that way, remaining “transhistorically suspended” due to the 
triple ethical, political, and religious motivation. Permanently modern, incapable of being 
thought as something that passes and recedes in time, the Shoah is a stone of stumbling 
and a challenge for historiography.15 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in La fiction du politique
12 Ibid., 23.
13 Ibid.,12
14 M. Foucault, „Kant i problem aktualności,” trans. B. Banasiak, Pismo Literacko-Artystyczne, 
1987, no 6, 75. (After Polish translation KM )
15 On the subject o f  religious discourse after the Shoah, see: Rabbi Byron L. Sherwin,
Sparks Amidst the Ashes: the Spiritual Legacy o f Polish Jewry, Oxford University Press,
1997; A. Ravitzky, “Wpływ Holocaustu na współczesną ortodoksyjną myśl żydowską,”
Res Publica Nowa, 2001, no 8. The implications o f adopting the “transhistorical” 
perception o f  the Holocaust for the public sphere and political practice in Israel is 
discussed by Y. Zerubavel in “The Death o f  Memory and Memory o f  Death: Masada 
and the Holocaust as Historical Metaphors,” in: Representations 1994, no 45, and
S. Friedländer, “Memory o f the Shoah in Israel: Symbols, Rituals, and Ideological 
Polarization,” in: The Art Memory: Holocaust Memorials in History, ed. J. E. Young, The 
Jewish Museum, New York — Munich, Prestel, 1994.http://rcin.org.pl
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and Jean Francois Lyotard in Heidegger et ‘les ju ifs,’” offer the classic ethical argument 
demonstrating the supra-historical character o f the Holocaust as “the fault-line cutting 
across the continuity o f western history.” For the former, quoted by Milchman and 
Rosenberg, the Shoah is a caesura that, “being inside history, disrupts history and opens 
another historical possibility or closes down all historical possibilities.”16 This position, 
however, still allows both possibilities of change in historical orientation implied by the 
fact of the Holocaust. In the second part o f Heidegger et ‘les ju ifs,’ which is a response 
to Lacoue-Labarthe, Lyotard presents the opinion that the Holocaust annuls the future in 
a specific manner, for nothing new can happen anymore, nothing that could be more cur­
rent than the Holocaust, nothing that could make the Holocaust a bygone fact inscribed 
in the existing categories of history. Recently Berel Lang has undertaken a polemic with 
Lyotard’s position.17 His argument is that the Holocaust has “hurled us back into history,” 
abolishing “the utopia o f progress with the im m oral vision of historical redemption in­
scribed into it.” The consequence o f the Holocaust is the growing awareness that evil of 
the past never finds its “justification” in any of the possible “happy futures,” which signifies 
the demise of the philosophy of history and not of history itself. It is no accident that the 
“post-H olocaust” times are linked to the violent revelations o f the “pre-Holocaust” past, 
as if that past could be revealed only now, after the dismantling of metaphysics, which 
m ade possible the metahistorical, safe perception o f the horror o f history. Emphasizing 
that this is a bitter fruit o f the Holocaust, Lang defends the tendency o f contemporary 
consciousness to “be inside history” from the discourse that transform s the event of the 
Holocaust into a “metaphysical residue,” a supra-historical Absolute. He believes that 
the Shoah will not cease to be the mystery o f evil and the source o f moral obligation if 
we acknowledge its fundamental historicity. We can confront the “problem of evil” itself 
only when we cannot escape it any more, from “inside history.” And undoubtedly, one 
o f the forms o f such an escape is seeing the Holocaust in “transcendental” terms and 
the fixation which does not allow to see it as “a part o f the history of evil,” without hope 
for redemption in the future “state o f purpose.”
Reflection on the Holocaust in its “transformative” dimension leads to the renewal 
o f the question about the relationship between freedom and necessity in the context of 
constituting history. If we think more deeply about Milchman’s and Rosenberg’s thesis, 
it implies a renewed mobilization o f the time o f history by activating the horizon o f the 
future. The anxiety related to the future dimension o f the Holocaust would then signify 
not an elimination o f the historical dimension in postmodernity, a peculiar synchro- 
nicity o f all wrongs experienced in history (or post-history, as was often claimed in the 
course o f such arguments), but conversely, an open horizon o f the future, defined by 
contemporary anxieties and by the image of a desirable future, an image mediated by 
the rational project of activity toward such a future. This image o f the future will never 
be stabilized as a logically necessary shape o f what is to come, but it will remain an ethi­
16 A. Milchman and A. Rosenberg, Eksperymenty..., 12.
17 B. Lang, “The Post-Holocaust vs. Postmodern. Evil Inside and Outside History,” in:
Holocaust Representation. Art within the Limits o f History and Ethics, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore &  London, 2000. 8
7http://rcin.org.pl
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cally necessary shape of the future we are obliged to act toward. The future proceeds here 
from a new, Adornian categorical imperative, an imperative that establishes an intention 
o f acting directed toward the future, after all illusion o f progress has ceased, both in its 
M arxist and liberal versions.
Such renewal o f the historical dimension in postm odernity (provided that, together 
with Lacan and Lacoue-Labarthe, we consider the Holocaust the end o f modernity) is 
defined by a paradox related to the surprising repetition (rather than negation) of the 
basic tenets of the Enlightenment. The ultimate discrediting o f the Enlightenment phi­
losophy of history by the appearance o f the genocidal universum, and the undermining 
o f the idea o f immanent teleology of history expressed in the law o f historical progress, 
unexpectedly revealed the inherent characteristic of the Enlightenment as the intentional 
political project. The Kantian notion o f m oral progress, to be realized in universal ethics 
and international law based on this ethic, has proven to be relevant insofar as it is based 
on willing participation o f free, ethically obliged subjects, not determined by historical 
necessity, m ind’s cunning, and teleology o f Nature.18 Hanna Arendt was aware o f this 
when she claimed in The Origins o f Totalitarianism  that “ [i]f there is any sense in the 
eighteenth century formula that man has come o f age, it is that from now on man is 
the only possible creator o f his own laws and the only possible maker o f his own history” 19 
[emphasis mine, TM ]. This is a task, however, that no one has undertaken yet, and that 
“terrifies with its magnitude.” For the Enlightenment did not fulfill its promises, assum ­
ing wrongly that the necessity for moral and political progress can be derived from  the 
idea of human nature. Yet no one could expect at the time that the “post-Auschwitz” 
knowledge about human beings and their nature will arouse “serious doubts about the 
existence o f natural laws”; in effect, human beings are “no longer the measure [of hu­
man laws] despite what the new humanists would have us believe,”20 and political order 
requires an entirely new basis that can be provided only by free, sovereign legislation 
based on new ethics, a type o f a new foundational act. As Arendt observes, only the 
greatest tragedy could have forced us to undertake such a challenge.
How great our calamity actually is can be gauged from the fact that to achieve even so simple 
a task as the prevention of murder, we are forced to doubt the unchallenged existence of the 
basic tenets of morality upon which the whole structure of our life rests and which none of 
the great revolutionaries, from Robespierre to Lenin, ever seriously questioned. We can no 
longer believe with Lenin that “people will gradually become accustomed to the observance 
of the elementary rules of social life that have been...repeated for thousands of years” (State 
and Revolution) and we must therefore try for what Burke’s great common sense deemed 
impossible: “new discoveries.in  morality...or in the ideas of liberty” (Reflections on the 
Revolution in France).21
18 Cf. Hanna Arendt, K ant’s Political Philosophy (notes), Courses University o f  Chicago,
seminar 1970, The Hanna Arendt Papers, Library o f  Congress, call number 032255.
19 H. Arendt, “Concluding R e m a rk s .,” 437.
20 Ibid., 435 and 436.
21 Ibid., 438. http://rcin.org.pl
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It is worth pointing out that the above idea has been entirely ignored by the authors 
o f the Eksperymenty w myśleniu o Holokauście in their account o f Hanna Arendt’s 
thought.22 And yet a consideration o f this line o f thinking could have reinforced their 
argument at points which are crucial for them. For what has already been said implies 
that Arendt considers the Holocaust to be a special event, isolated in history, that makes 
people aware o f the course o f history and its potentially dangerous direction. Arendt 
thus understands the Holocaust as a Kantian signum remmemorativum, demonstrativum 
et prognosticum f although she does not define it as the absolute historical exception.24 
The “post-Auschwitz” situation means above all the necessity for the new beginning of 
human history in the sense o f the new beginning of political order.
Only a consciously planned beginning of history, only a consciously devised new polity, will 
eventually be able to reintegrate those who in ever-increasing numbers are being expelled 
from humanity and severed from human condition...The concept of human rights can again be 
meaningful only if they are redefined as a right to the human condition itself, which depends 
upon belonging to some human community... [These rights] can be implemented only if they 
become the prepolitical foundation of a new polity, the prelegal basis of a new legal structure, 
the, so to speak, prehistorical fundament from which the history of mankind will derive its 
essential meaning in much the same way Western civilization did from its own fundamental 
origin myths.”25
There are twofold consequences o f m aking human rights, the rights which humans 
proclaim themselves and which do not have any transcendent guarantees, into the pre­
political basis of the new political order.
Firstly, the foundation o f human rights implies the restriction o f the sovereign 
right of the nation states and, in consequence, the right of the international community 
to intervene if  genocide is suspected.26 The current situation after Auschwitz signifies,
[t]he emergence of mankind as one political entity, [and] makes the new concept of “crimes 
against humanity,” expressed by Justice Jackson at the Nuremberg Trials, the first and most 
important notion of international law. It should be recognized, however, that with this notion 
international law...enters the sphere of a law that is above the [sovereign] nations...Russian 
concentration camp, on the other hand, in which many millions are deprived of even the 
doubtful benefits of the law of their own country, could and should become the subject of 
action that would have to respect the rights and rules of sovereignty.27
22 A. Milchman and A. Rosenberg, Eksperymenty..., pp. 174-195.
23 Cf. I. Kant, The Contest o f Faculties, Cambridge UP, 1970.
24 From the start Arendt considers Gulag and Auschwitz to be comparable phenomena.
25 H. Arendt, “Concluding Remarks,” 439.
26 Sh. Weiss, Holokaust i nowy ład międzynarodowy, paper delivered at the conference 
PamięćShoah, współczesne reprezentacje, Łódź, M ay 2003 (typescript).
27 H. Arendt, “Concluding Remarks,” 436-7; c f J. Habermas, “Dispute on the Past and 
Future o f  International Law,” 2003.
68http://rcin.org.pl
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Secondly, thinking through the Gulag and the Holocaust -  that, in Arendt’s thought, leads 
to the suspension o f the problem of absolute exceptionality of the Holocaust, implying 
a universalization -  is not in itself a sufficiently effective means to establish the new law. 
It is, however, undoubtedly, “a way toward the new form  of universal solidarity.”
Because those who were expelled from  humanity and from  human history, and 
thereby deprived of their human condition, need the solidarity o f all men to assure them 
o f their rightful place in “man’s enduring chronicle.”28
Thus the conclusion of these considerations brings us back again to the problem of the 
new ethic as an expression o f the new political beginning of human history. It is an ethic 
o f universal solidarity o f the living, based on the anamnetic solidarity with all those who 
were murdered. By opening the horizon o f the future, this ethic actuates history again.
Translation: Krystyna M azur
28 H. Arendt, “Concluding Remarks,” 439.http://rcin.org.pl
